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BALANCING BUSINESS INTERESTS WITH
CONSUMER CONCERNS: A COMPARATIVE
EXAMINATION OF U.S. AND E.U. COMMERCIAL
EXPRESSION DOCTRINES
SCOTT SIVLEY†
ABSTRACT
Warning: This Note does not deal with a particularly new nor particularly
interesting subject. If sellers of goods and information were this forthcoming when
making claims about their products, this Note would not be necessary.
Unfortunately, there is a colossal tug of war, as illustrated by the Occupy Movement
in the fall of 2011 and as campaign financing during the 2012 American election
cycle has and will continue showing us, emerging in the domestic and global
marketplace over who should ultimately be responsible for protecting consumers
from irresponsible or false commercial speech. Should we continue down the road of
survival of the fittest and leave it up to consumers to wade through the muck of
puffery and illusion in an information age when new technologies and ideas pop up
virtually overnight, or do governments and those who claim to look out for
everyone’s best interest have a responsibility to do their job and regulate to provide
for greater transparency? In fact, “consumers” is an erroneous description in this
debate because it, in a sense, dehumanizes who consumers are, consumers are
people with inalienable rights not some legal construct such as a corporation whose
basic governing rules can wax and wane based on the whims of a state and a court.
The legal profession has a role to play in this tug of war, but unfortunately more and
more of those in the judiciary bring a clouded view of what the law should be and
blindly discredit the idea that entities whose sole purpose is to make money will
generally do whatever they can to make money. The differences in the law of the
United States and the European Union are admittedly subtle in this area, but the
opinions and the authoritative articulations of the law have a profound, divergent
effect on its consumers (a.k.a. citizens). The United States is a promise promulgated
on its commitment to all of its peoples with business freedom serving its people not
the other way around. Our laws should reflect that promise.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I wish [the Manicheans] might have heard what I said in comment on
those words—without my knowing that they heard, lest they should think
that I was speaking it just on their account. For, indeed, I should not have
said quite the same things, nor quite in the same way. . . . And if I had so
spoken, they would not have meant the same things to them as they did to
me . . . .1
Since St. Augustine‟s time, technology has evolved and people experience more
during a lifetime, but core truths concerning the processes and susceptibilities of the
human mind remain virtually unchanged.2 In later times, Rousseau and other
enlightenment philosophers crafted arguments to free humanity from the bonds of

1

ST. AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, THE CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE, Book Nine, Chapter
IV, 8 (Albert C. Outler trans. and ed.), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/
confessions-bod.html.
2
Because of internet, mobile phones and satellite television, humans simply have more
information at their disposal. Because of transportation shifting from horses to trains, cars and
planes, people may go more places. All of these basic facts of life allow the average human to
have a far more robust life experience, but for example, most people have always feared death
and the unknown, and both even in our technological age still drive many of our behaviors.
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political and economic servitude. Freedom of expression was at the core of
developing individual dignity, autonomy and self-realization.3
Today, freedom of individual expression remains the cornerstone of democracy. 4
Pertinent to this paper, how far does that right extend in its pure form to commercial
speakers? How one answers that question may depend on whether he or she views
commercial speech as information transformed into a product that comes with
responsibilities or simply as another legal category that serves the same purpose as
other forms of protected speech? 5
The consumer society, to which we all belong, is predicated on business
delivering messages that drive people to action.6 Businesses spend exorbitant
amounts of money on effective psychological techniques to penetrate the media
cloud of haze.7
This Author takes the position that, if protected at all, commercial expression
should remain subsidiary under freedom of expression doctrines of the United States
and the European Union. Moreover, U.S. courts should adopt a more expansive
understanding of how advertising works and more carefully examine the intent and
effect of language and images used in modern advertising. It will be shown by
progressively reviewing Supreme Court holdings that today there are few (and
becoming fewer) limits to commercial speech in America because the Court‟s
opinions take the position that consumers have the right to more information which
burdens them to increasingly becoming experts to make proper choices. However,
the preferred model should encompass the European approach where the societal
interest rests more in the accuracy of advertising claims and eliminating some of the
clutter and ambiguity that advertised messages purposely create.
Most important to this analysis involves an examination of differences between
the two systems in how the “societal interest” is considered. The case law will show
that differences on this point lead to divergent outcomes between the systems. I will
analyze both systems‟ constitutional histories and frameworks and review relevant
case law before espousing a preferred approach.

3

See generally JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY
(1755). An inescapable premise of this paper is that the social contract is more important in a
technological society of today than even the agrarian state in which it was conceived.
Irresponsible expression destroys the balance between the powerful with access to media and
the weak who have little resources to speak or the ability to band together. Ultimately, a
democracy is so skewed by such an imbalance because there is no equity in form or substance.
4

ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 3 (2003).

5

See generally id. at 3.

6

Advertising is de facto evidence of this practice.

7

IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW
CONSUMER MARKETS 395 (2007).

AND
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE U.S. AND E.U.
A. The United States of America
1. The Supreme Court of the United States
The United States of America is a constitutional federal republic with a
constitution dating to 1789.8 Its constitution has an entrenched set of rights, 9 and
among other provisions sets forth the powers of the judiciary of the United States,
including the establishment of the highest court, which is the United States Supreme
Court (the Supreme Court), and other “inferior” courts established by Congress. 10
There are avenues of appeal to the highest court, but most importantly the Supreme
Court, if it so chooses to exercise its power, is the final interpreter of constitutional
questions.11 For comparative purposes, cases examined in this paper are limited to
U.S. Supreme Court rulings.
2. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
The controlling constitutional authority for freedom of expression is guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”12 The First Amendment now extends to state governments under the
doctrine of incorporation.13 For most of its history, American jurisprudence
understood the freedoms enjoyed to be either protecting individuals from the abuses
of government or restraining the activities of government. 14 One hundred fifty-three
years passed from the Bill of Rights adoption without the Court examining whether
business purposes merit any protection under the speech clause. 15
As differentiated from individual speech, commercial expression is now
considered a low-level speech category,16 and is currently examined under the four
prongs of the Central Hudson: Does the expression concern a lawful activity; and is
it not misleading? If both are answered “yes,” then one is to consider whether the
“asserted governmental interest is substantial.” Finally, if “yes,” a determination of
whether the regulation is proportionate must be made. Proportionality is determined
8
The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2011).
9

MARK TUSHNET, LIVING WITH A BILL OF RIGHTS, IN UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS
(Connor Gearty & Adam Tomkins eds., 1995). Entrenchment simply means that there are
rights guaranteed to the people as part of the constitution. In the U.S. those rights are the first
ten amendments also known as the Bill of Rights.
10

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

11

Id.

12

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

13

Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).

14
See Steve Mount, Constitutional Topics: Bar to Federal Action, U.S. C ONSTITUTION
ONLINE, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_bor.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2010).
15
16

Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52 (1942).

Chaplisky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (acknowledging that First
Amendment protection does not extend completely to all speech).
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by examining whether the regulation directly advances the government‟s interest and
is it narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 17
B. The European Union
The European Union (E.U.) is the current product of multilateral treaties agreed
to by European States following World War II to avoid future clashes and promote
prosperity while moving toward a more unified Europe. 18 There is no actual
constitutional apparatus for the E.U.; alternatively, a bolstered treaty framework
remains intact.19 While this framework is more of a political agreement between
states than a strict legal framework, the states‟ actions have shown intent to give up
elements of sovereignty not typically granted in traditional treaties, and have
certainly created a “specified legal order.”20 That order includes making individuals
of the member states citizens of the E.U.21 Subsequently, they have rights that are
interpreted on the Community level against member states.22
The cooperative efforts took two paths in the early days. 23 One path flowed from
human rights concerns24 while the other centered on economic and political
stability.25 Each path resulted in the following separate convention frameworks.
17
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‟n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
18
Post World War II Europe, cooperative efforts first came in the steel industry among a
few nations and with the purpose evolving toward establishing the internal market, and thus
not particularly interested in dealing with fundamental rights of persons. It was nearly twenty
years later that The European Court of Justice “would protect fundamental rights as general
principles of law. See generally ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT
OF JUSTICE 337 (2006).
19
What the EU Constitution Says, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
2950276.stm (last updated June 22, 2004) (“The constitution brings together for the first time
the many treaties and agreements on which the EU is based. It defines the powers of the EU,
stating where it can act and where the member states retain their right of veto.” After being
signed in June 2004, French and Dutch voters rejected it and thus the effort failed.). See
generally The „Treaty of Lisbon,‟ EUROACTIV.COM, http://www.euractiv.com/en/futureeu/treaty-lisbon/article-163412 (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) (The Treaty of Lisbon was created
after the failed attempt at a constitution. It contains many of the changes envisioned to have
been part of the Constitutional Treaty but instead were formulated as amendments to the
existing treaties. After contentious efforts, most notably in Ireland, the Treaty of Lisbon came
into force on Dec. 1, 2009.).
20
P S R F MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 39 (2007). They have done
this by making the agreements limitless in duration, created agreed upon institutions for
enforcement and the law binds not only the member states together but also residents of the
member states.
21

Id.

22

See generally id. at 5 n. 8.

23
See Patricia R. Waagstein, Human Rights Protection in Europe: Between Strasbourg
and Luxembourg, SPICE, http://spice.stanford.edu/docs/human_rights_protection_in_europe
_between_strasbourg_and_luxembourg/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
24
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights as amended by
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 (adopted Nov. 4, 1950 as amended June 1, 2010), C.E.T.S. No. 194,
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1. European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is enforceable against all
forty-seven signatories.26 While controlling over the ECHR member states, it was
initially and only observed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), acting on behalf
of the E.U., out of respect for the “common constitutional traditions of the member
states.”27 This interplay will be discussed further in the ECJ section.
Commercial speech, as applied by both the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and ECJ, is part of freedom of expression but has been afforded less
protection than other forms of individual expression, particularly political
expression.28 The test employed by both courts is effectively stated by the ECtHR as
follows: “[i]t should therefore be determined whether it was „prescribed by
law,‟ whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph
and whether it was „necessary in a democratic society‟ to achieve such aims.”29 The
ECJ adds gloss to this test. It uses the word “justified” in its reasoning when
examining the legal basis, which is similar to the “prescribed by law” language of
the ECtHR. It adds proportionality, which is similar to Central Hudson, but in effect
it is simply a more thorough method of analyzing the “necessity” component the
ECtHR utilizes.
2. The European Court of Human Rights
Section II, Article 19 of the ECHR established the ECtHR.30 Its jurisdiction is
laid out in Article 32, which states, “1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to
all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the
213 U.N.T.S. 221, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF 1950,
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ENG
ENG_CONV.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter ECHR]. The European Convention
on Human Rights of 1950 established the original concept of the now European Court of
Human Rights.
25

See Arnull, supra note 18, at 5. Article 31 of the Treaty establishing the Economic Coal
and Steel Community of 1951 established “a court of justice” to interpret and apply the treaty
for the member states. Now, the functions of the court of justice are: As part of that mission,
the Court of Justice of the European Union: reviews the legality of the acts of the institutions
of the European Union, ensures that the Member States comply with obligations under the
Treaties, and interprets European Union law at the request of the national courts and tribunals.
The Court thus constitutes the judicial authority of the European Union and, in cooperation
with the courts and tribunals of the Member States, it ensures the uniform application and
interpretation of European Union law. See also EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE WEBSITE,
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter ECJ
Website].
26

Frequently Asked Questions, ECtHR, Oct. 2010 edition, at 5-6, http://www.echr.coe.int
/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-42CB-B8BD-CBBB781F42C8/0/FAQ_ENG_A4.p d f ( l a s t
visited Nov. 17, 2011).
27

ECJ Website, supra note 25.

28

Church of Scientology v. Sweden, E.C.C. 511, 527 (1979).

29

Markt Intern GmbH & Beermann v. Germany, 12 E.H.R.R. 161, 172 (1990).

30

ECHR, supra note 24, Section II, art. 19.
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protocols thereto . . . . 2. In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.”31 Besides binding judgments as set forth in
Article 46, the ECtHR may also make advisory opinions through its Article 47
powers.32
The ECtHR reviews cases brought against states 33 by individuals, groups of
individuals, other contracting states, 34 companies, and even NGOs.35 The decisions
of the ECtHR are binding against states, and member states “are obliged” to put the
decision into force.36
3. Article 10 of the ECHR
Article 10 of the Convention provided the first shared articulation of freedom of
expression among European states. 37 Unlike the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, Article 10 of the ECHR includes provisions outlining the rights
and the duties along with responsibilities those rights entails:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 38
4. The Treaty of Lisbon
Following the failed attempt at a constitution, the latest and most comprehensive
of the treaties of the European Union is the Treaty of Lisbon. 39 Coming into force on

31

Id. art. 32.

32

Id. art. 46-47.

33

Id. art. 34.

34

Id. art. 33.

35

Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 26, at 7-8.

36

Id. at 10.

37
ECHR, supra note 24, Section I, art. 10 §§ 1-2 (this is more than the number of current
members states in the E.U.).
38
39

Id.

Treaties and Law, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (last visited
Dec. 16, 2010).
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December 1, 2009, it has consolidated and amended many of the agreements 40 made
since the first agreement on coal and steel in 195241 until today, with E.U.
membership now including 27 states. 42 It formally made the Charter of Fundamental
Rights binding law in the E.U,43 and maintained the ECJ as the superior court for
questions of E.U. law44 with jurisdiction to decide human rights cases. 45
The body that is now known as The Court of Justice for the European Union
(ECJ) was first established in 1952 by the treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community,46 and just as the E.U. has expanded so too has the ECJ‟s
jurisdiction and mandate.
Today, it interprets and applies E.U. legislation for uniform application in all
member states. It hears cases involving member states, EU institutions and EU
citizens.47 Each member state has a seat on the Court, but usually hears cases as a
panel of thirteen or five. Additionally, the court is assisted by advocates-general
who compile cases and present preliminary decisions on the matters that come
before the panels and whose opinion is included in the public record. 48 The Court,
aside from adjudicating cases, may also provide preliminary rulings upon request of
member states that act as advisory opinions. 49 This supports the court‟s primary goal
of bringing consistency to the laws of the E.U. 50
As mentioned, the ECJ looks to the traditions of the member states, which allows
it to give weight and validity to the ECHR. This is legally referred to as “accession,”
and as related to fundamental rights, was first recognized in an ECJ decision of
1986.51 With amendments made by the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECJ now must accede
40

Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007/C306/01, available at EUROPA.EU,
http://europa.ed/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter
Treaty of Lisbon].
41

MATHIJSEN, supra note 20, at 13.

42

Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40, ¶ 2.

43

Id. ¶ 3.

44

Institutions, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 16,
2010) [hereinafter Institutions].
45

See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40.

46

Institutions, supra note 44.

47

Id.

48

Id. See also ECJ Website, supra note 25 (explaining the public hearing and advocate
general‟s role).
49

Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40.

50

ECJ Website, supra note 25 (court within the legal order of the E.U.).

51

See id. “After numerous terrorist attacks against the police, police officers in Northern
Ireland began carrying fire-arms. However, on the grounds of public safety, women police
officers were not authorised to carry fire-arms (on the basis of a certificate issued by the
competent minister which could not be challenged before the courts). As a result, full-time
contracts in the Northern Ireland police were no longer offered to women. On a reference
from a United Kingdom court, the Court held that excluding any power of review by the
courts of a certificate issued by a national authority runs counter to the principle of effective
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to the ECHR when applying “general principles of the Union‟s law,” however; this
accession does not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its
institutions.52
The Court of Justice‟s incorporation of the principles of the ECHR into Union
law made it possible to maintain the independence of the ECtHR and ECJ while
creating coherence in their work.53 More to the point, commercial expression is a
concept that encompasses both economic behavior and human rights, so it is an area
of the law that is perfectly suited for the ECJ to weighs-in on since it does so
primarily acknowledging the fact that there is a human rights component to all
economic decisions54
The Charter of Fundamental Rights came into effect in 2000,55 but only with the
adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon is it now legally binding. 56 Article 11 is far less
comprehensive than its companion, Article 10 of the ECHR, and as such, is not cited
as often in case law or any comparative cases used in this paper. Article 11 states,
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” 57
As explained, the ECJ and the ECtHR are autonomous and distinct, however
both cooperate and, as will be seen, use the same basis for deciding cases.
Therefore, a sampling of cases from both courts will be analyzed to provide a view
as to the approach the E.U. has taken on commercial speech.

judicial control which may be relied upon by all persons who consider themselves wronged by
discrimination on grounds of sex (Johnston, 1986).”
52

Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40 at Protocol 8 concerning Article 6 (1) and (2).

53

See generally ARNULL, supra note 18, at 368.

54

See Waagstein, supra note 23.

55

The Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/
charter_fundamental_rights_en.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2010) (“The EU's Charter of
Fundamental Rights was solemnly proclaimed by the Nice European Council on 7 December
2000. It is based on the Community Treaties, international conventions such as the 1950
European Convention on Human Rights and the 1989 European Social Charter, constitutional
traditions common to the Member States and various European Parliament declarations. . . .
the Charter defines fundamental rights relating to dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity,
citizenship and justice. While the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is limited
to protecting civil and political rights, the Charter goes further to cover workers' social rights,
data protection, bioethics and the right to good administration.”).
56
57

See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 11, Dec. 18, 2000,
2000/C364/01, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 16. 2010).

238

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:229

III. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE U.S. AND E.U.
A. American Commercial Expression
1. Before Central Hudson
In 1942, The United States Supreme Court weighed in on what (if any) level of
protection should be enjoyed by commercial actors in Valentine v. Chrestensen.58
The case involved a New York City sanitation code making it illegal for any person
to “throw, cast or distribute . . . commercial or business advertising matter” on the
public streets, public areas or private property. 59 The majority firmly expressed its
longstanding commitment to freedom of expression in the public arena, particularly
noting streets.60 The Court went on to just as firmly state, “the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.” 61
Relying on advice from the police commissioner that handbills with information
of a public use or protest62 was acceptable, Chrestensen published a handbill that on
one side promoted his business while the other side protested §318 of the code. 63
The court noted Valentine‟s efforts to circumvent the intent of the law by stating, “If
[merchants‟] evasion were successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast
advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral
platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's command.” 64 Even while holding that
commercial speech was not protected under the First Amendment,65 the case was the
harbinger of an oncoming commercial speech debate.
The next major step in carving out the protection for commercial expression
came in 1975 with Bigelow v. Virginia.66 In that case, the Supreme Court reviewed a
Virginia statute that made the circulation of any publication that advertised support
of abortion in any manner illegal. 67 Bigelow, the editor of a Virginia-based
newspaper, had allowed an advertisement to be printed that let readers know
abortions were legal in New York State and provided information for a referral
service. Bigelow was convicted under the Virginia law and subsequently appealed
to the Supreme Court.68 The Supreme Court reversed his conviction. 69
58

Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 53.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 52.

63

Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53-54.

64

Id. at 53-54.

65

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 758 (1976) (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)).
66

See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

See id. See also Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 759-60.
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While not explicitly carving out protection for commercial speech, the Court
stated Chrestensen was limited in validity, and commercial speech was not
valueless.70
Following Bigelow just one year later in 1976, the transition to protecting
commercial speech was completed with Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council.71 In this case, the Supreme Court finally considered
whether a First Amendment exception to commercial speech existed. 72 The
plaintiffs, a consumer group known as Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, sued,
challenging § 54-524.35 of the Virginia Code Annotated. 73 The code regulated the
professional conduct of pharmacists and specifically limited the ability of
pharmacists to advertise or promote the prices or terms of a transaction for the sale
of drugs requiring a prescription.74 The relevant text of the statute is §§ 2 and 3 of §
54-524.35, which stated:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who
. . . (2) issues, publishes, broadcasts by radio, or otherwise, or distributes
or uses in any way whatsoever advertising matter in which statements are
made about his professional service which have a tendency to deceive or
defraud the public, contrary to the public health and welfare; or (3)
publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner
whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit
terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any
drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription. 75
The consumer group, as appellees, argued that First Amendment protection flows
not only to advertisers but also to the recipients of the information.76 The Court
agreed with this proposition by stating, “[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing
speaker. But where a speaker exists . . . the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”77
The Board of Pharmacy took the position that commercial speech was not
afforded any protection under the First Amendment. 78 The Court pointed out that,
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Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819.
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Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 761-62.
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Id. at 760-61.
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Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 748, 756-57.

77

Id. at 757 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), in which the
Court upheld the First Amendment rights of citizens to receive political publications sent from
abroad.) “More recently . . . we acknowledged that this Court has referred to a First
Amendment right to „receive information and ideas,‟ and that freedom of speech „necessarily
protects the right to receive.‟”
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since 1951, no protection had been denied simply because the speech was
commercial.79
The Court differentiated this case from Chrestensen, Bigelow, and other cases by
stating:
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural,
philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any particularly
newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about
commercial matters. The “idea” he wishes to communicate is simply this:
“I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.” Our question,
then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of
the First Amendment.80
The Court decided the prevailing societal interest was the free flow of information
instead of the public harm that could come with less regulation at the point of sale in
the pharmaceutical industry,81 and stated, “Advertising, however tasteless and
excessive . . . is nonetheless dissemination of information . . . . It is a matter of
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.82
The Court held that commercial speech was afforded protection under the First
Amendment, but there were instances where it could be regulated. 83 Soon, this
approach was ingrained by the Supreme Court when it established the Central
Hudson test for commercial expression.84
2. Central Hudson
The Supreme Court set forth the modern test for American commercial
expression in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York.85 The question presented in this case was whether a regulation of the
Public Service Commission of the State of New York violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments because it completely banned promotional advertising by
an electrical utility.86
Following the energy crisis of the 1970s, the Public Service Commission of New
York (hereinafter PSC) sought a continued ban on advertising materials. It divided
advertisements “into two broad categories: promotional-advertising intended to
stimulate the purchase of utility services-and institutional and informational, a broad
category inclusive of all advertising not clearly intended to promote sales.” 87 It
79

Id. at 759.
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Id. at 761.
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Id. at 765.
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Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
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proceeded to declare all promotional advertising to be contrary to public policy and
banned it, but allowed informational advertising to continue. 88 Its reasoning was to
encourage advertising that shifted consumption practices of the public toward more
energy efficient means.89
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. (hereinafter Central Hudson) lost at each
level prior to the Supreme Court, because consumers actually had no choice when it
came to deciding who would provide electrical power. 90 Central Hudson was
challenging the restraint of commercial speech under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.91
The Court first noted the limitation on states to regulate First Amendment rights
because of the Fourteenth Amendment. 92 Then the Supreme Court affirmed the
Virginia Bd. proposition of the societal interest in commercial speech by stating,
“[c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest
possible dissemination of information.” 93 Before explaining the test, the Court
reaffirmed its position that “[t]he Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The
protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of
the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.” 94
The Court then established the current four-part test:
[1.] If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed.
[2.] The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech.
[If both of these prongs are satisfied, the Court then goes to the next level
of analysis.] Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to
that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to
achieve the State's goal. Compliance with this requirement may be
measured by [the following] two criteria.
[3.] The restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose.
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See id. at 559-60.
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[4.] If the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot
survive.95
In this case, the question really involved the second prong of the test.96 Applying
the test, the Court held that while the governmental interest in controlling and
adapting energy usage was substantial and the regulation did directly advance the
government‟s interest, the regulation was not narrowly tailored to serve the interest
of the state and therefore it was found to be unconstitutional. 97
3. After Central Hudson
Interestingly, the Central Hudson test is best considered in the context of cases
dealing with the highly regulated products of alcohol, tobacco and pharmaceuticals
that follow.
In 1995, the Supreme Court examined the appropriateness of alcohol content
appearing on the labels of beer products.98 Coors Brewing Company (hereinafter
Coors) was challenging § 205(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act that
prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol content. 99
The government argued for a deferential approach instead of applying Central
Hudson in this case, because there was a history of more leeway being granted when
the regulation concerned socially harmful activities.100 The Court disregarded this
line of argument and moved on to the government‟s attempt to meet its burden by
asserting two interests it felt were sufficiently “substantial” to justify the labeling
ban.
First, the Government contends that § 205(e)(2) advances Congress' goal
of curbing “strength wars” by beer brewers who might seek to compete
for customers on the basis of alcohol content. According to the
Government, the FAAA's restriction prevents a particular type of beer
drinker-one who selects a beverage because of its high potency-from
choosing beers solely for their alcohol content. In the Government's view,
restricting disclosure of information regarding a particular product
characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers will select the
product on the basis of that characteristic.101
Additionally, the government argued that its efforts aided those of states that
wished to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-first Amendment, and would prevent
consumers from crossing state lines to thwart certain states‟ laws on the matter. 102
95

Id. at 564.
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See generally id.
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See id.
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See generally Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
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Coors reframed the government‟s intention as one which was designed to control
competition on the basis of strength of beer. 103 It noted the trend toward more
information not less for consumers. 104 The Court rejected the so-called “strength
war” argument because, while it may be substantial, it did not directly advance the
governmental interest.105
Ultimately, the Supreme Court first rejected the government‟s claim of assisting
the states under part two of the test, declaring that the stated interest was not
substantial enough to meet the requirements. 106
Only a year later in 1996, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island required the
Supreme Court to review a Rhode Island statutory ban on advertising alcoholic
beverage prices in places other than the store. 107 In this case, the Court further
expanded its deference to commercial speech under the First Amendment, and in so
doing, watered down the Central Hudson test by stating, “[W]hen a State entirely
prohibits the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading commercial messages for
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less
reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands.”108
The case centered on two separate 1956 statutory prohibitions of the Rhode
Island codes.109 The first applied to vendors‟ efforts to advertise prices except on
the product or signs near the product in the store. 110 The other ban prohibited the
media from broadcasting advertisements for the sale of alcoholic beverages. 111 44
Liquormart had placed a newspaper ad in 1991 leading to this case. 112
Rhode Island took the position that the prohibitions promoted reduced
drinking.113
Therefore, the Court had to determine whether the ban
would significantly reduce alcohol consumption.114 The Court found no evidence
that there would be a significant reduction in consumption. 115
The Court grounded its decision by stating, “As a result, neither the „greater
objectivity‟ nor the „greater hardiness‟ of truthful, non-misleading commercial
speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression with added deference.”116
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Summing up its reasoning for striking down the Rhode Island legislation, the court
reiterated Virginia Board of Pharmacy by favoring a country where information is
“misused” over a country where information is suppressed. 117
In Thompson v. Western States a group of licensed pharmacists who specialized
in compounding drugs sought to invalidate § 127(a) of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1997.118 The Act exempted “compounded
drugs” from the FDA‟s standard drug approval requirements so long as the providers
refrained from advertising or promoting particular compounded drugs among other
restrictions. Their position was that this was an infringement of their First
Amendment rights.119
The government conceded that the providers were making truthful statements
that were not misleading, but grounded its argument in three substantial interests.
Those interests were: preserving the new drug approval process‟s effectiveness,
ensuring those patients who needed the compounded drugs had access, and creating
the proper balance between two compelling opposed views. 120
Writing for the majority, Justice O‟Connor suggested a number of non-speech
methods for accomplishing the goals of the government. 121 She then noted that the
government gave no evidence that her options would be unworkable, which is
important since it is up to the party wishing to limit speech to carry the burden under
Central Hudson.122
The majority ruled that § 127a was unconstitutional. 123 The government had
failed to justify any of its reasons, and the Court seemingly was concerned with the
overbreadth of the statutory construction, as it would impinge, for instance, upon
pharmacists who served special clienteles.124
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court had to determine whether
certain tobacco product advertising regulations were pre-empted by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), and whether certain
Massachusetts regulations on the advertisement and sale of tobacco products
violated the First Amendment.125 For purposes of this paper, only the second
question will be examined.
The regulations in question were 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§
21.04(5)(a), 22.06(5)(a) (2000) which prohibited advertising of smokeless tobacco or
cigars within a 1,000 foot radius of a school or playground 126 and 940 Code of Mass.
117

See generally id.
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Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, at 556 (2001) (quoting Board of Trustees
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3038 (1989)).
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Regs. §§ 21.04(5)(b), 22.06(5)(b) (2000) which restricted advertising to no “lower
than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is located within a one
thousand foot radius of any school or playground.” 127
The parties stipulated that the advertisements concerned lawful activity and were
not misleading.128 Furthermore, no contention was made that the government did not
have a substantial interest in preventing tobacco use among minors. 129 Justice
O‟Connor then explained that the Central Hudson test‟s third prong demands
scrutiny of the relationship between the harm caused and how the methods the State
uses to advance its interests directly and materially meet its objective. 130
Justice O‟Connor then expressed the standard for justifying restrictions included
academic studies and examples of similar situations from different areas, but
empirical data was not necessary.131
The Massachusetts Attorney General cited a Surgeon General report that
provided significant statistical analysis supporting the proposition that advertising
and labeling played a significant role in a youth‟s decision to use cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco.132 The majority accepted this and additional evidence to find
that the regulations did advance the governmental interest.133
Moving to the last prong of narrow tailoring, Justice O‟Connor confirmed that
“the least restrictive means” is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a
reasonable fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish
those ends . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” 134
At the final stage of inquiry, the 1,000-foot outdoor regulation failed Central
Hudson.135 The petitioners‟ argument that the geographical reach of the regulations
would significantly diminish, the access adults had to cigarette and smokeless
tobacco advertising, the point nearing a complete ban. 136 “Petitioners maintained
that this . . . would prevent advertising in 87% to 91% of Boston, Worcester, and
Springfield, Massachusetts. . . . Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
regulations prohibit advertising in a substantial portion of the major metropolitan
areas of Massachusetts.137
The ban also included advertising in the store if visible from outside the store
while also restricting the size of the ads plus any oral statements. 138 Ultimately,
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these facts show the Attorney General did not adequately consider the broad
geographical sweep of the regulation, and thus that it was not narrowly tailored nor
were the speech interests properly calculated.139
940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§ 21.04(5)(b), 22.06(5)(b) (2000), requiring
advertisements be a minimum height of five feet off the floor, failed both the third
and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test in the majority‟s opinion. 140 The Court
highlighted the third prong and pointed out that not all children are shorter than five
feet tall, and even if not that tall, almost all have the ability to look up the relatively
short distance to see the advertisement. 141 Therefore, the regulation did not advance
the government‟s substantial interest.142
B. European Commercial Expression
As previously mentioned in part II of this paper, commercial expression is
protected under Article 10 of the ECHR. 143 The ECtHR has granted much more
deference to regulations restricting commercial speech than in its consideration of
restrictions on other forms of expression. 144 The ECtHR has paid particular attention
to the phrase “necessary in a democratic society,” and interpreted it to imply a
pressing social need is at stake.145 To interpret this requirement, the ECtHR has
taken a similar approach to the U.S Supreme Court by distinguishing types of
expression and then applying an appropriate level of scrutiny. 146 Given the
peculiarities of the E.U., the ECtHR has given member states a bit of discretion in
determining whether a “pressing social need” exists in its state.147
While the ECtHR has more expansively applied its commercial expression
doctrine to a wider array of commercial speech than just conventional advertising, 148
the U.S has remained focused solely on advertising, and thus for comparative
purposes, only advertising cases will be examined in this section.
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Casado Coca v. Spain, 18 E.H.R.R (1984) (“In its Barthold v. Germany judgment of 25
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The first case the ECtHR examined in the area of commercial speech 149 came in
1979.150 At issue in Church of Scientology v. Sweden was a Swedish court‟s
injunction of the use of the phrase “an invaluable aid to measuring man's mental
state and changes in it”151 in an advertisement that appeared in a Scientology
magazine promoting the Hubbard Electrometer. The Scientologists advertised the
“E-Meter” as a “religious artifact used to measure the state of electrical
characteristics of the „static field‟ surrounding the body.” 152 In this case, the ECtHR
rejected any freedom of religion claims the Scientologists might have had. 153
The Court announced that commercial speech is part of freedom of expression
but it is not afforded the same rights as political expression. 154 In its decision, the
Court differentiated between Scientology‟s right to have religious opinions on the EMeter and using those opinions to profit from the sale of the E-Meter under Article
10.155
The Court used the text of Article 10(2) to develop a three-pronged test: 1. the
restriction imposed must be prescribed by law; 2. whether there is a legitimate aim of
the restriction; and 3. is the restriction necessary? 156
In this case, the controlling law was the 1970 Marketing (Improper Practices) Act
which prohibited unfair marketing practices, including unfair advertising methods. 157
Therefore, prong one was met. The Court found the legitimate aim of the State was
that of protecting consumers from misleading and deceptive practices, which it noted
was consistently found in the States‟ own legislation, thus satisfying prong two. 158
Finally, the Court held that the restriction was necessary given the facts of the case
and the goals of the Convention.159 The Court also created a standard of review in
which it stated “the test of „necessity‟ in the second paragraph of Article 10 should
therefore be a less strict one when applied to restraints imposed on commercial
„ideas.‟”160 Accordingly, the Court upheld the injunction on the phrase used in the
advertisement.161
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Another case that mixed concepts usually tied to free expression was the case of
Markt Intern & Beermann v Germany.162 Instead of religion this case brought in
elements of freedom of the press.163 The case involved Markt Intern, a trade
magazine publisher that reprinted a letter written by Mr. Klaus Beermann to a British
mail order company stating his dissatisfaction with the product. 164 Markt Intern was
attempting to gain a response from the company on behalf of Mr. Beermann. 165 The
mail order company did respond and the response was published. 166 Markt Intern‟s
subsequent column went further by requesting submissions from readers related to
the products and customer service of the mail order company.167
German courts granted an interim injunction based on the idea that Markt Intern
had breached § 1 of the Unfair Competition Act 1909. 168 After fifteen years of the
case working its way through the German courts and a negative result in the
European Commission, Germany submitted the question of whether it had violated
article 10 of the ECHR to the ECtHR. 169
In its analysis, the ECtHR reiterated the test for examining an Article 10 case that
it had employed in Scientology170 by stating, “[i]t should therefore be determined
whether it was „prescribed by law,‟ whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate
aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was „necessary in a democratic
society‟ to achieve such aims.”171
The ECtHR upheld the injunction as applied to the test.172 Prong one of the test
was met because Germany had based its injunction on the 1909 Unfair Competition
Act mentioned earlier. When making a determination relating to prong two, the
Court considered there was a legitimate aim on the part of Germany to protect the
rights of others.173 While there were lesser disputes over the first two prongs‟
applicability in the case, the main question came down to whether the action taken
was necessary in a democratic society. 174 The Court rooted its decision in the
idea that the machine was incapable of determining one‟s mental state given the generally
accepted definition of “mental state.” See id.
162
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“margin of appreciation” granted to member states to enact and enforce regulations
that are particular to the circumstances of its own people and systems of governance
and commerce.175 Notwithstanding the “margin of appreciation,” the court also
examined its necessity by weighing the proportionality of the regulatory effect to aid
the rights of others with the right to publish the information. 176
The court recognized that truthful disclosures are of interest to readers and
promote open business dealings, but even true information describing real events
may sometimes be prohibited to uphold the privacy of others or maintain the
confidentiality of some information. 177 The ECtHR found the German court had
reached a reasonable decision that did not exceed the “margin of appreciation”
granted to national courts.178
In 2004, the ECJ reviewed an Austrian court decision to issue an injunction that
restricted the use of the phrase “insolvency auction” in an advertisement for goods,
which were no longer being sold during an insolvency estate sale. 179 In Herbert
Karner Industrie GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH, the ECJ applied reasoning that looks
very similar to Central Hudson, and reiterated many of the same propositions that the
ECtHR articulated.180
In reviewing the Austrian regulation, the ECJ examined Articles 28 and 30 EC
and applied Council Directive 84/450/EEC as amended by 97/55/EC, which
concerns misleading and comparative advertising in business-to-consumer and
business-to-business transactions.181 The purpose of that directive was “to protect
consumers . . . against misleading advertising . . . .” 182 The directive defined
175

See id. at 174. “Such a margin of appreciation is essential in commercial matters and, in
particular, in an area as complex and fluctuating as that of unfair competition. Otherwise, the
European Court of Human Rights would have to undertake a re-examination of the facts and
all the circumstances of each case. The Court must confine its review to the question whether
the measures taken on the national level are justifiable in principle and proportionate.” See
Randall, supra note 145, at 57-58 (“Under the margin of appreciation doctrine, the standard of
review varies not only according to the category of speech at issue; other factors, such as the
aim pursued by the measure, the policy field concerned and the uniformity or divergence of
state practice, also play an important role. This will have to be borne in mind when analyzing
the restrictions of commercial speech.”).
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whether the Federal Court's reaction was appropriate or whether the statements made in the
specific case by Markt Intern should be permitted or tolerated.” Id.
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misleading advertising as “any advertising which in any way, including its
presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive . . . by reason of deceptive nature, [and]
is likely to affect their economic behavior. . . .”183
To determine whether the advertisement was misleading, the Court looked to the
characteristics of goods and services advertised, their availability, origination, and
even tests of products, among other considerations. 184 Prior to his preliminary
analysis on behalf of the court, the advocate general stated the goal: “[i]n the Court‟s
case law, consumer protection and fair trading are considered to be overriding
requirements in the general interest which are in principle capable of justifying
restrictions” on advertising and movement of goods.185
The advocate general reminded the Court of its responsibility to uphold the
ECHR when within the scope of Community law, and additionally stated that
commercial expression is part of Article 10(1) of the ECHR, and advertising
specifically is part of commercial expression. 186 When making its judgment, the
Court accepted the advocate general‟s finding that the regulation was a restriction on
freedom of expression and restricted truthful information. 187
The advocate general articulated the test that the ECJ applied in its judgment. 188
The threshold inquiry for the court to examine is whether the restriction is
justified.189 The Court then summarized the test:
[T]he discretion enjoyed by the national authorities in determining the
balance to be struck between freedom of expression and the
abovementioned objectives varies for each of the goals justifying
restrictions on that freedom and depends on the nature of the activities in
question. When the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a
discussion of public interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which
the Member States have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited
to an examination of the reasonableness and proportionality of the
interference. This holds true for the commercial use of freedom of
expression, particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating as
advertising.190
When examining whether a regulation is justified, the Court first looked to
Article 10(2) that expressly states that “freedom of expression may be restricted in so
far as such restriction is necessary and provided for by law.” 191 Comparison to
ECtHR cases, in particular Markt Intern and Casado Coca, was made to show that
advertisements being restricted to protect others‟ rights and reputations is consistent
183
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with the ECtHR view that commercial expression may be restricted more extensively
than political expression because “commercial expression does not normally perform
a wider social function of any significance.”192
Upon passing this threshold, the next consideration was whether the prohibition
on advertising is necessary.193 Truth is an element considered in gauging necessity,
but the context of the truth is as vital.194 Subsequently, when the seller wanted to call
his auction an “Insolvency Auction” although the items came from another
insolvency estate sale, it was necessary to regulate such behavior to protect the
interests of the consumers and other competitors as well.195 The ECJ held that, given
the facts and the deference Member States are given, the restriction on the
advertising was reasonable and proportionate to achieve consumer protection and
fair trading.196
IV. WHICH APPROACH IS BETTER FOR THE U.S. AND E.U. IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
It is clear from the case law of both systems that today commercial expression
holds a subsidiary place under freedom of expression of the individual. However, if
one created an accurate commercial speech continuum, the American case law
would be much closer to making commercial expression fully protected than its
European peers. More alarming to those who support the subsidiary approach is that
the United States may be trending toward placing commercial expression on an
equal level to political speech.197
From cases examined, there are areas of divergence between the two systems.
These areas include who is best suited to analyze truth or what is not misleading;
what level of deference will the courts give the representative bodies of the people;
and what value is there in commercial speech. 198
A. Who Decides What is Misleading?
The Karner case is a good example of the difference between truth and accuracy.
The items had come from an insolvency estate at some point, but the sale in question
was not an actual direct insolvency sale. 199 As such, the ad was not accurate, and so
the court upheld regulations to prevent the sale being advertised as such. 200

192

Id.

193

See generally id.

194

Id.

195

Id. at 95.

196

Id. at 106.

197
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This contrasts with the Supreme Court‟s majority opinion in Virginia Bd. where
the balance of power in the commercial speech debate shifted to corporate interests
with one line: “people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them.”201
How can one be well enough informed when the individual spends far less time
and resources to understand the messages being fired at him or her daily? If the item
in question is coming from a street vendor selling Tiffany jewelry, buyer beware
would probably and should suffice. But what if it is a compound drug being sold by
a pharmacist without the normal regulation of the FDA, as in Thompson. 202
Thompson is the best example of the American system being too attached to the
ideal as opposed to the reality that the public simply does not always have the time,
resources and, unfortunately, the mindset to combat advertisements that purposely
distort a human sense of reality. 203
B. The Courts vs. Legislatures
There are areas of the law that lend themselves to greater appreciation for the
findings of the duly elected representatives of the people. Commercial expression
should be one such area.
Justice O‟Connor, writing for the majority in Lorillard, stated that justifications
for restrictions need not be strictly empirical data. She accepted academic studies
and examples of similar situations from different areas; but when reviewing the
deference the U.S. Supreme Court has given congressional and regulatory agencies‟
findings, this seems to be an imperfect science that has been too strictly applied by
the Supreme Court in an effort to open the door wider for commercial expression.
Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Thompson, weighed in on the risk of dismissing
congressional findings too readily in order to apply the commercial speech doctrine
by stating,
[T]he Constitution demands a more lenient application . . . which, in
particular, clearly distinguishes between “commercial speech” and other
forms of speech demanding stricter constitutional protection. Otherwise,
an overly rigid “commercial speech” doctrine will transform what ought
to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the
health and safety of the American public into a constitutional decision
prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary protections. As history
in respect to the Due Process Clause shows, any such transformation
would involve a tragic constitutional misunderstanding. 204
The contrast is easily made when compared against the Markt Intern case. There
the ECtHR reiterated the approach that member states should have a “margin of
appreciation” to decide what is best for their particular society‟s interests. 205
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Moreover, however, the legal question of what governmental body is better suited to
make such decisions must be considered is a running theme through the cases
examined in this paper.206 Should it be a court of very thoughtful people who are
unaccountable and as such may uphold ideals without regard to the practical
implications,207 or would the Courts be better served by giving greater deference to
the regulatory agencies, legislative findings and laws, and experts, such as in the
Scientology case?208
While answering this question, Justice Breyer‟s dissent brings focus to the most
pressing question: what is necessary for democracy to thrive? 209 The European
judicial decisions in this area, stemming from the express mandate of Article 10 of
the ECHR, illustrate a greater appreciation for these “goals of society” as opposed to
a blind adherence to a debatable principle of commercial expression. 210 None of the
judges or laws cited in this paper state any deviation from the idea that freedom of
personal expression particularly in the area of political speech is crucial to the
development and furtherance of democratic societies. Nor do any propose that
commercial expression should be on an equal standing. However, those who
willfully conflate core democratic values with marketplace desires do so at the risk
of losing the very freedom western culture expounds.
C. What Value is Really Being Protected?
Many of the best warnings of the potential problems with putting commercial
expression on par with human expression come not from a bleeding-heart liberal but
are encapsulated by then-Justice William H. Rehnquist, a highly respected
conservative. Dissenting in Central Hudson, he wrote,
The line between “commercial speech,” and the kind of speech that those
who drafted the First Amendment had in mind, may not be a technically
or intellectually easy one to draw, but it surely produced far fewer
problems than has the development of judicial doctrine in this area since
Virginia Board.
For in the world of political advocacy
and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a “fraudulent” idea:
there may be useless proposals, totally unworkable schemes, as well as
very sound proposals that will receive the imprimatur of the “marketplace
of ideas” through our majoritarian system of election and representative
government. The free flow of information is important in this context not
because it will lead to the discovery of any objective “truth,” but because
it is essential to our system of self-government.211
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Some Supreme Court justices argue that too much regulation or judicial
adherence to strict standards of truth and accuracy are paternalistic. 212 Others take
the view that advertising undermines consumer sovereignty by creating a
dependence effect which fuels the consumers‟ desires, not out of self-choice, but
because advertising techniques are designed to create desires in an unsuspecting
public.213 This is critical because how one sees the purposes and needs of speakers
and recipients of commercial speech will determine how he or she will decide a case
on the question of commercial expression. If the American jurisprudence is to
evolve toward the European approach, stricter standards on commercial expression
need to be applied; otherwise the American consumer and ultimately the American
democracy will suffer.
V. CONCLUSION
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court should reexamine its commercial
expression doctrine under Central Hudson by re-evaluating what is actually at stake
and in the best interests of the American democratic society. To do this it must
apply a common sense 21st century understanding of the role and effect of
advertising, and place people‟s interests ahead of business interests.
However, the issue of commercial expression may simply be one that is a blind
spot for the legal profession and politicians on both sides in America because
increasingly they rely on the same tricks of the trade as the advertisers and marketers
to gain victories for their side. In conclusion, this paper ends where it began with a
not-so-subtle warning against these trappings:
During those years I taught the art of rhetoric. Conquered by the desire
for gain, I offered for sale speaking skills with which to conquer others. . .
. I really preferred to have honest scholars . . . and, without tricks of
speech, I taught these scholars the tricks of speech—not to be used against
the life of the innocent, but sometimes to save the life of a guilty man.
And thou, O God, didst see me from afar, stumbling on that slippery path
and sending out some flashes of fidelity amid much smoke—guiding
those who loved vanity and sought after lying, being myself their
companion.214
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